Active Directory & Identity Assessment
BloodHound CE graph telemetry, Kerberoasting exposure, and Domain Admin attack paths for CORP.ACME.LOCAL.
1 Shortest Path to Domain Admin
Kerberoastable Users
1SPN Registered
Extractable TGS-REP hash (RC4-HMAC)AS-REP Roastable
1No Pre-Auth
Offline hash cracking possible without credentialsUnconstrained Delegation
1High Risk
TGT theft via SpoolSample or PetitPotamDomain Admin Accounts
3Tier-0 Assets
2 Active, 1 Stale (90+ days inactive)Critical Escalation Vector: Workstation to Enterprise Domain Admin
Path length: 4 hops. Compromise of a single perimeter user enables total Active Directory forest compromise.
Step 1: Initial FootholdPhished Workstation User
Standard domain user jdoe@CORP.ACME.LOCAL
MITRE: T1566.001
Step 2: Local Privilege EscalationLocal Administrator on WS-04
Service account credential cached in LSASS memory
MITRE: T1003.001
Step 3: Lateral MovementKerberoasting svc_sql_prod
Extract TGS hash; cracked offline to reveal cleartext password
MITRE: T1558.003
Step 4: Forest TakeoverDCSync & Domain Admin
Replicate NTDS.dit password hashes from DC01.corp.acme.local
MITRE: T1003.006
AI Architect Containment Strategy:
1. Restrict LSASS memory access by enabling Windows Defender Credential Guard.
2. Revoke Domain Admin logon rights on tier-1 and tier-2 workstations (enforce Microsoft Tiered Administrative Architecture).
3. Convert svc_sql_prod to a 128-bit managed service account (gMSA) to neutralize Kerberoasting.