Global Defense CorpTENANT-ISOLATED
Engine Online

Active Directory & Identity Assessment

BloodHound CE graph telemetry, Kerberoasting exposure, and Domain Admin attack paths for CORP.ACME.LOCAL.

1 Shortest Path to Domain Admin
Kerberoastable Users
1SPN Registered
Extractable TGS-REP hash (RC4-HMAC)
AS-REP Roastable
1No Pre-Auth
Offline hash cracking possible without credentials
Unconstrained Delegation
1High Risk
TGT theft via SpoolSample or PetitPotam
Domain Admin Accounts
3Tier-0 Assets
2 Active, 1 Stale (90+ days inactive)

Critical Escalation Vector: Workstation to Enterprise Domain Admin

Path length: 4 hops. Compromise of a single perimeter user enables total Active Directory forest compromise.

CRITICAL RISK (CVSS 9.8)
Step 1: Initial FootholdPhished Workstation User

Standard domain user jdoe@CORP.ACME.LOCAL

MITRE: T1566.001
Step 2: Local Privilege EscalationLocal Administrator on WS-04

Service account credential cached in LSASS memory

MITRE: T1003.001
Step 3: Lateral MovementKerberoasting svc_sql_prod

Extract TGS hash; cracked offline to reveal cleartext password

MITRE: T1558.003
Step 4: Forest TakeoverDCSync & Domain Admin

Replicate NTDS.dit password hashes from DC01.corp.acme.local

MITRE: T1003.006
AI Architect Containment Strategy:

1. Restrict LSASS memory access by enabling Windows Defender Credential Guard.
2. Revoke Domain Admin logon rights on tier-1 and tier-2 workstations (enforce Microsoft Tiered Administrative Architecture).
3. Convert svc_sql_prod to a 128-bit managed service account (gMSA) to neutralize Kerberoasting.